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POM WONDERFUL V. COCA-COLA AND THE 
IMPLICATIONS OF GRANTING 
COMPETITORS THE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE 
FALSE OR MISLEADING FOOD AND 
BEVERAGE LABELS UNDER THE  
LANHAM ACT  
Matthew Busch∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION
In POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co.,1 the United States 
Supreme Court unanimously decided that the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) does not preclude Lanham Act suits 
between competitors challenging false or misleading food and 
beverage labeling.2 This ruling means that food and beverage makers 
do not have to rely exclusively on the United States Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) to bring enforcement actions against 
competitors engaged in false advertising.3 POM Wonderful instead 
allows for a private right of action, empowering food and beverage 
makers to bring suit against companies whose false or misleading 
labels cause competitive injury.4 
This Comment examines POM Wonderful in detail, approving 
of its result, while pointing out questions left unanswered due to the 
Court’s limited holding. Part II of the Comment provides background 
on the statutory and regulatory framework underlying the Lanham 
Act and the FDCA. Part III lays out the relevant factual and 
∗  J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. History, University
of California, Berkeley, 2009. Special thanks to Professor Jennifer E. Rothman for her time, 
attention, and legal advice. Thanks to Cameron Bell and Andrew Beshai; without their help, this 
Comment would not have been possible. 
1. 134 S. Ct. 2228 (2014).
2. Id. at 2241.
3. See id. at 2239; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at
27, POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. 2228 (No. 12-761), 2014 WL 827980, at *27. 
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012); POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2238.
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procedural background that led to the Court’s decision. Part IV 
discusses the Court’s justification for why the Lanham Act and the 
FDCA are complementary. Part V analyzes the following questions 
raised by the case: Will the decision have any effect on 
 consumer-driven false-advertising suits? Will courts apply POM 
Wonderful beyond food and beverage labeling? Is the Supreme Court 
wary of the primacy of federal administrative agencies? Finally, Part 
VI answers these questions and concludes that allowing 
competitor-versus-competitor false-advertising suits will give 
companies greater power to police their own markets and prevent 
competitors from gaining advantages through use of false or 
misleading labeling. 
II. THE STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
A. The Lanham Act
In 1946, Congress enacted the Lanham Act to make actionable 
the deceptive and misleading use of trademarks, to protect against 
unfair competition, and to prevent fraudulent reproduction of 
registered trademarks.5 While the Lanham Act’s trademark 
provisions are the primary means of safeguarding against unfair 
competition, the Act also creates a federal remedy “that goes beyond 
trademark protection.”6 Further, the Lanham Act creates a cause of 
action for unfair competition through misleading advertising or 
labeling.7 The Act allows one competitor to sue another if, “in 
commercial advertising or promotion,” a competitor “misrepresents 
the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or 
her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities.”8 
B. The FDCA
Enacted in 1938, the FDCA gives the FDA authority to protect 
public health and safety through the regulation of food, drugs, and 
5. Lanham (Trademark) Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 1127). 
6. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 29 (2003).
7. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1395 (2014).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B).
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cosmetics.9 In this capacity, the FDCA prohibits the false or 
misleading labeling of food and beverages.10 If the FDA determines 
that a particular food or drink label is false or misleading, it has the 
power to issue warning letters requesting that the product 
manufacturer take corrective action.11 In addition, if a false or 
misleading food or beverage label “presents a risk of illness or injury 
or gross consumer deception,” the FDA may request that the 
manufacturer recall the product.12 Food and beverage labels, 
however, are not regulated to the same extent as other product labels 
under the FDCA’s purview, namely drug labels.13 While the FDA 
preapproves drug labels prior to sale,14 it does not preapprove juice 
labels under its regulations.15 
By its terms, the FDCA does not provide for a private right of 
action.16 Accordingly, prior to POM Wonderful, a food and beverage 
manufacturer injured by a competitor’s misbranding was at the 
mercy of the FDA.17 An injured competitor could only rely on FDA 
enforcement if the agency, at its own discretion, determined that the 
mislabeled food or drink adversely impacted public health or 
safety.18 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
POM Wonderful LLC (“POM”) produces, markets, and sells 
POM WONDERFUL brand bottled pomegranate juice and various 
pomegranate juice blends.19 The Coca-Cola Company (“Coca-
Cola”), under its Minute Maid family of products, makes a 
competing juice blend with a label that displays the words 
“pomegranate blueberry” far more prominently than other words on 
9. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938)
(codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399(f) (2012)); see 62 Cases of Jam v. United States, 340 U.S. 593, 
596 (1951). 
10. 21 U.S.C. § 343(a).
11. See id. § 336.
12. 21 C.F.R. § 7.45(a) (2014).
13. See 21 U.S.C. § 355.
14. See id. § 355(d).
15. POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2235 (2014).
16. 21 U.S.C. § 337.
17. See id.
18. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837–38 (1985).
19. POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2233.
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the label.20 In truth, Coca-Cola’s product only contains 0.3 percent 
pomegranate juice and 0.2 percent blueberry juice.21 
Claiming that Coca-Cola’s use of the label is deceptive and 
misleading, POM brought suit under the Lanham Act’s 
false-advertising provision.22 According to POM, because 
Coca-Cola’s product only contains trace amounts of pomegranate 
and blueberry juices, Coca-Cola can charge less for its beverage than 
its competitors can charge for theirs.23 POM argued that because 
consumers invariably select cheaper products believed to be of the 
same quality, Coca-Cola unfairly diverts business from POM and 
other competitors in the pomegranate-blueberry juice market.24 
Nevertheless, the district court granted partial summary 
judgment to Coca-Cola, holding that the FDCA and its regulations 
preclude challenges to the naming and labeling of Coca-Cola’s juice 
blend.25 The court reasoned that “[t]he FDA has directly spoken on 
the issues that form the basis of Pom’s Lanham Act claim” and has 
ruled that the Coca-Cola label is acceptable “even if pomegranate 
and/or blueberry are merely characteristic, rather than primary juices 
in the [j]uice.”26 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding 
that Congress had “entrust[ed] matters of juice beverage labeling to 
the FDA,” and it did not want to “risk undercutting the FDA’s expert 
judgments and authority.”27 
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
In an 8–0 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth 
Circuit’s ruling and held that “the FDCA and the Lanham Act 
complement each other in the federal regulation of misleading 
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2012).
23. First Amended Complaint for False Advertising at 7, Pom Wonderful LLC v. Coca Cola
Co., No. CV 08-06237 SJO (FMOx), 2013 WL 543361 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2013), 2009 WL 
2913255. 
24. Id.
25. POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2235–36.
26. Pom Wonderful LLC v. Coca Cola Co., 727 F. Supp. 2d 849, 871–73 (C.D. Cal. 2010),
rev’d, 679 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d, POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. 2228. 
27. Pom Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 679 F.3d 1170, 1177–78 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d,
POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. 2228. 
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labels.”28 As a preliminary matter, the Court narrowed the scope of 
its decision by explaining that POM Wonderful is not a preemption 
case, in which the question would be whether a federal statute 
supersedes a state law.29 Instead, the Court recognized that POM 
Wonderful is a statutory interpretation case involving the 
“intersection and complementarity” of two statutory regimes, the 
Lanham Act and the FDCA.30 
POM argued that the preclusion analysis “concern[ed] whether 
one statute, the FDCA as amended, is an ‘implied repeal’ in part of 
another statute, i.e., the Lanham Act.”31 According to POM, the 
Court must give full effect to both statutes unless they were in 
“irreconcilable conflict,” and Coca-Cola failed to satisfy this high 
standard.32 By contrast, Coca-Cola argued that “the case concern[ed] 
whether a more specific law, the FDCA, clarifies or narrows the 
scope of a more general law, the Lanham Act.”33 Ignoring both of 
these “competing maxims,” the Court held that “the FDCA and the 
Lanham Act are complementary and have separate scopes and 
purposes.”34 While “the Lanham Act protects commercial interests 
against unfair competition,” the Court stressed that the FDCA is 
limited to “protect[ing] public health and safety.”35  
The Court supported its conclusion that the FDCA and the 
Lanham Act are complementary by first interpreting the two statutes’ 
text.36 By its terms, the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act 
(NLEA), a 1990 amendment to the FDCA, includes an express 
preemption provision and does not contain any preclusion language 
preventing another federal law from regulating food and beverage 
labeling.37 According to the Court, Congress’s omission of a 
preclusion provision serves as “powerful evidence that Congress did 
28. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration of this case. POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct.
at 2241. 
29. Id. at 2236.
30. Id. at 2233.
31. Id. at 2236–37.
32. Id. at 2237.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 2236, 2240.
35. Id. at 2238.
36. Id. at 2237.
37. Id.
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not intend FDA oversight to be the exclusive means of ensuring 
proper food and beverage labeling.”38 
Next, the Court examined the complementary nature of the 
remedies offered by both statutes.39 The Court explained that 
enforcement of the FDCA is largely committed to the FDA, which 
“does not have the same perspective or expertise in assessing market 
dynamics that day-to-day consumers possess.”40 By contrast, the 
Court recognized that unlike agency rulemakers, competitors are 
uniquely positioned to assess sales and marketing data.41 And, 
because Lanham Act suits serve a distinct compensatory function, 
the Court reasoned that allowing for a private right of action would 
incentivize manufacturers to “behave well.”42 
Finally, the Court explained that allowing the FDCA to preclude 
Lanham Act claims challenging food and beverage labels would 
contravene Congress’s intent.43 Unlike drug labels, food and 
beverage labels are not subject to FDA preapproval, and instead the 
FDA relies on enforcement actions and warning letters to police 
these types of labels.44 According to the Court, “if Lanham Act 
claims were to be precluded then commercial interests—and 
indirectly the public at large—could be left with less effective 
protection in the food and beverage labeling realm than in many 
other, less regulated industries.”45 The FDCA’s failure to adequately 
safeguard competitors’ commercial interests influenced the Court’s 
belief that Congress did not intend for there to be less policing of 
food and beverage labels than of other products’ labels in 
competitive markets.46 
For these reasons, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding 
that the FDCA is not “a ceiling on the regulation of food and 
beverage labeling” and noting instead that the Lanham Act and the 
FDCA are complementary in the federal regulation of misleading 
labels.47 Additionally, the Court noted that “Lanham Act actions are 
38. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
39. Id. at 2238.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 2238–39.




47. Id. at 2240.
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a means to implement a uniform policy to prevent unfair competition 
in all covered markets.”48 Consequently, the Court decided that 
Coca-Cola’s argument that Lanham Act food labeling claims would 
undermine national uniformity was without merit.49 
V. ANALYSIS
The Court correctly decided that competitors may bring Lanham 
Act claims challenging food and beverage labels regulated by the 
FDCA. Allowing for a federal private right of action will empower 
companies to bring suit against competitors whose false or 
misleading labels cause competitive injury. Before the POM 
Wonderful decision, FDA warning letters and the threat of 
administrative enforcement actions proved insufficient remedies to 
companies suffering economic loss attributable to competitors’ false 
or misleading labels. But, in the wake of POM Wonderful, 
companies may obtain the same remedy available to consumers 
under state consumer protection statutes, an injunction requiring a 
product label change.50 
Even though POM Wonderful was fundamentally correct, the 
Court’s ruling still raises questions: Will the decision have any effect 
on consumer-driven false-advertising suits? Will courts extend the 
ruling beyond the scope of food and beverage labeling? Finally, does 
the decision reflect the Supreme Court’s wariness of the long-
standing dominance of federal administrative agencies? These 
questions are addressed in the sections that follow. 
A. POM Wonderful’s Impact on
Consumer-Driven False-Advertising Suits 
The POM Wonderful Court explicitly narrowed the scope of its 
inquiry to the interplay between two federal statutes when it 
explained that this case was “not a pre-emption case.”51 
Consequently, the decision did not address the feasibility of 
48. Id.
49. See id.
50. Adam M. Reich et al., POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca Cola Company: Have the Tides
Turned in the Legal Food Fight?, LEXOLOGY (July 1, 2014), http://www.lexology.com/library 
/detail.aspx?g=dcb012e3-2fdf-4eed-9ef7-9ad4c1de383e (citing CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE 
§ 17200 (West 2014)).
51. POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2236.
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traditional defenses to consumer class actions challenging food and 
beverage labels.52 
With respect to preemption, the POM Wonderful Court 
acknowledged that the NLEA, the FDCA’s 1990 amendment, has a 
preemption provision that expressly forbids “a State . . . from 
imposing requirements that are . . . not identical to corresponding 
FDCA requirements for food and beverage labeling.”53 Accordingly, 
courts generally find that the NLEA preempts state law food and 
beverage labeling claims in which the disputed label has been 
specifically addressed by, and conforms to, existing FDA 
regulations.54 Because the POM Wonderful Court explicitly stated it 
would not address preemption, the preemption defense remains a 
severe hurdle to class action plaintiffs seeking to invoke state 
consumer protection laws.55 
Similarly, the primary jurisdiction doctrine remains a cognizable 
defense in the wake of POM Wonderful.56 “The primary jurisdiction 
doctrine allows courts to stay proceedings or to dismiss a complaint 
without prejudice pending the resolution of an issue within the 
special competence of an administrative agency.”57 In other words, 
primary jurisdiction enables a court to determine that an otherwise 
valid claim “implicates technical and policy questions that should be 
addressed in the first instance by the agency with regulatory 
authority over the relevant industry rather than by the judicial 
branch.”58 
For example, in Saubers v. Kashi Co.,59 class action plaintiffs 
brought state law claims against Kashi arguing that its food products 
52. Reich et al., supra note 50.
53. 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 (2012); POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2238 (internal quotation marks
omitted). 
54. See, e.g., Young v. Johnson & Johnson, 525 F. App’x 179, 185 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Because
[plaintiff’s] state law action seeks to impose [cholesterol labeling] standards that are not identical 
to those set forth in the [FDA’s] regulations, it is expressly preempted by the NLEA as it relates 
to those claims.”); Carrera v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc., 475 F. App’x 113, 115 (9th Cir. 
2012) (holding that claims that an ice cream manufacturer violated California consumer 
protection laws by stating that its product contained “0g Trans Fat” were expressly preempted by 
the NLEA, which permits products containing less than 0.5 grams of trans fat per serving to 
express this amount as zero). 
55. See Reich et al., supra note 50.
56. Id.
57. Clark v. Time Warner Cable, 523 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 2008).
58. Id.
59. No. 13CV899 JLS (BLM), 2014 WL 3908595 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2014).
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were “misbranded.”60 According to the plaintiffs, Kashi’s use of the 
term “evaporated cane juice” on its labels was false and misleading 
because evaporated cane juice is merely ordinary sugar.61 Because 
the FDA was still waiting on public comments before it finalized 
rules pertaining to evaporated cane juice, the court held that the 
primary jurisdiction doctrine warranted dismissal of the plaintiffs’ 
claims.62 
Nevertheless, the Saubers plaintiffs attempted to argue that 
POM Wonderful stands for the general proposition “that courts need 
not defer to the FDA’s expertise in suits over deceptive or 
misleading food labeling.”63 
The Saubers court found this argument unconvincing, and 
instead correctly recognized that POM Wonderful stands exclusively 
for the proposition that the FDCA does not preclude Lanham Act 
false or misleading advertising claims brought by competitors.64 
Accordingly, POM Wonderful does not ensure the continued 
viability of consumer-driven class actions for false or misleading 
labels. As the POM Wonderful Court acknowledged, its decision did 
not challenge the preemption defense’s validity.65 Moreover, as 
Saubers correctly illustrates, POM Wonderful did not eliminate the 
use of primary jurisdiction as a defense to consumer-driven 
false-labeling actions.66 
And, even if POM Wonderful does not by itself result in a 
reduction in consumer-driven labeling litigation, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend67 significantly limits 
consumers’ ability to attain class certification in labeling cases.68 In 
that case, the Court held that consumers seeking class certification 
must establish that damages are capable of measurement on a 
classwide basis.69 Applying Comcast Corp. to a beverage-labeling 
class action, Judge Dean Pregerson of the Central District of 
California noted that class certification is not feasible “[i]n situations 
60. Id. at *1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
61. Id.
62. Id. at *3.
63. Id. at *4.
64. Id.
65. POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2238 (2014).
66. Saubers, 2014 WL 3908595, at *4.
67. 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).
68. Reich et al., supra note 50.
69. Comcast Corp., 133 S. Ct. at 1433.
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where purported class members purchase an inexpensive product . . . 
and are unlikely to retain receipts or other transaction records.”70 
Consequently, it will be unsurprising if post-POM Wonderful, 
plaintiff’s attorneys cease filing consumer-based suits and instead 
focus more heavily on competitor-driven suits under the Lanham 
Act.71 
B. The Application of POM Wonderful
Beyond Food and Beverage Labeling
In POM Wonderful, the Court made clear that its holding 
applied exclusively to food and beverage labels regulated by the 
FDCA.72 An open question, however, is whether lower courts will 
expand the POM Wonderful holding to cases beyond the scope of 
food and beverage labeling.73 If district court cases decided after 
POM Wonderful are any indication, competitors may bring Lanham 
Act claims challenging product labels for a variety of products 
regulated by different federal administrative agencies. 
For example, in Catheter Connections, Inc. v. Ivera Medical 
Corp.,74 a medical device company sued a competitor under the 
Lanham Act for making false representations about an infection-
control device’s functional aspects.75 Recognizing that the plaintiff 
sought “to protect its interests in the market, just as POM Wonderful 
was doing in the case against Coca-Cola,” the Catheter Connections 
court held that the FDCA did not preclude certain Lanham Act 
claims.76 In support of its holding, the court reasoned that FDA 
expertise is not required in examining “what drives buyers’ 
purchasing decisions.”77 
Similarly, in Toddy Gear, Inc. v. Navarre Corp.,78 the court 
applied POM Wonderful in its analysis of the potential preclusive 
70. In re POM Wonderful LLC, No. ML 10-02199 DDP (RZx), 2014 WL 1225184, at *6
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2014). 
71. See Reich et al., supra note 50.
72. POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2233 (2014).
73. Jessie F. Beeber & Sarah S. Park, A Whole New Lanham Act? A Look at Lexmark and
POM Wonderful in Action, LEXOLOGY (July 15, 2014), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail 
.aspx?g=4a933260-ca83-4be4-bfd9-4f2c1315f319. 
74. No. 2:14-CV-70-TC, 2014 WL 3536573 (D. Utah July 17, 2014).
75. Id. at *2.
76. Id. at *5–7.
77. Id. at *6.
78. No. 13 CV 8703, 2014 WL 4271631 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 26, 2014).
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effect of the Textile Fiber Products Identification Act (TFPIA).79 In 
that case, a maker of a microfiber cloth used for cleaning electronic 
devices brought a Lanham Act claim for false advertising against a 
competitor.80 Like the FDCA at issue in POM Wonderful, the TFPIA 
provides exclusive enforcement authority to an administrative 
agency—the Federal Trade Commission in this case—to sanction 
companies engaged in false or misleading labeling.81 Holding that 
the TFPIA did not preclude a Lanham Act claim, the Toddy Gear 
court mirrored the POM Wonderful Court’s statutory interpretation 
analysis by arguing that the two statutes’ texts illustrate separate 
scopes and purposes.82 
Both Catheter Connections and Toddy Gear demonstrate that in 
the wake of POM Wonderful, courts will routinely disregard the 
preclusive effects of administrative statutes regulating a wide variety 
of products.83 Consequently, there will likely be a proliferation of 
Lanham Act suits concerning goods over which administrative 
agencies have traditionally held exclusive enforcement authority. 
This outcome is consistent with Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static 
Control Components, Inc.,84 which significantly relaxed the standing 
requirement to bring false-advertising claims under the Lanham 
Act.85 Decided by the Supreme Court shortly before POM 
Wonderful, Lexmark held that a competitor need only plead an injury 
to a commercial interest proximately caused by a company’s 
misrepresentations to invoke the Lanham Act’s false-advertising 
cause of action.86 Accordingly, following POM Wonderful and 
Lexmark, administrative-law preclusion will prove an ineffective 
roadblock to the likely expansion of Lanham Act false-advertising 
claims.87 
79. Id. at *2.
80. Id. at *1.
81. Id. at *2.
82. See id.
83. See Catheter Connections, Inc. v. Ivera Med. Corp., No. 2:14-CV-70-TC, 2014 WL
3536573, at *5–7 (D. Utah July 17, 2014); see also Toddy Gear, Inc., 2014 WL 4271631, at *2. 
84. 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).
85. Id. at 1389.
86. Id. at 1395.
87. See John Duffy, Opinion Analysis: The Triumph of the Lanham Act (and of Federal
Private Rights of Action), SCOTUSBLOG (June 13, 2014, 5:22 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com 
/2014/06/opinion-analysis-the-triumph-of-the-lanham-act-and-of-federal-private-rights-of-action/ 
(explaining “the Supreme Court’s increasingly ambivalent approach to administrative 
regulation”). 
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C. POM Wonderful Is Reflective of the Supreme Court’s
Increasing Ambivalence Toward Administrative Regulation 
Aside from its effect on the false-advertising litigation 
landscape, POM Wonderful also demonstrates that the Supreme 
Court has grown increasingly wary of the primacy of federal 
administrative agencies.88 Since the establishment of the 
administrative state, the Court has often cast administrative agencies 
in heroic terms;89 they were thought to “render valuable and very 
necessary services in the solution of the complex governmental and 
economic problems of our time.”90 Agency rulemakers’ specialized 
training and experience were considered an asset in determining 
policy in preparation for, or incidental to, administrative action.91 In 
holding that the FDA does not have the “expertise in assessing 
market dynamics that day-to-day consumers possess,” the POM 
Wonderful Court showed how little is left of that notion.92 
Although the Ninth Circuit barred POM’s Lanham Act claims 
out of concern that they might “undermine FDA authority,”93 the 
Supreme Court was not concerned with that possibility because the 
Court recognized the limits of the FDA’s competence.94 Competitors, 
the Court noted, “have detailed knowledge regarding how consumers 
rely upon certain sales and marketing strategies” and an “awareness 
of unfair competition practices [that] may be far more immediate and 
accurate than that of agency rulemakers and regulators.”95 
The Supreme Court’s concerns regarding administrative 
competence are not unique to the POM Wonderful decision. In fact, 
in a number of recent opinions, the Court has expressed deep 
hostility toward expansive administrative power.96 For example, in 
Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Accounting Oversight Board,97 the 
Court acknowledged “Congress’s power to create a vast and varied 
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 513 (1943) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
91. Id.
92. POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2238 (2014); Duffy, supra
note 87. 
93. Pom Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 679 F.3d 1170, 1176–78 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d,
POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2238. 
94. Duffy, supra note 87.
95. POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2238.
96. Duffy, supra note 87.
97. 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
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federal bureaucracy” and expressed concern that such growth 
“heightens the concern that [power] may slip from the Executive’s 
control, and thus from that of the people.”98 Additionally, in City of 
Arlington v. FCC,99 three Justices, in a dissenting opinion, reasoned 
that “[i]t would be a bit much to describe [agency rulemaking 
authority] as ‘the very definition of tyranny,’ but the danger posed by 
the growing power of the administrative state cannot be 
dismissed.”100 
It can therefore be inferred that much of the analysis in POM 
Wonderful reflects the Court’s recent skepticism concerning the 
regulatory scope and competency of agency enforcement.101 As a 
consequence, courts may follow POM Wonderful and look toward 
private rights of action as suitable substitutes for inadequate agency 
enforcement.102 
VI. CONCLUSION
POM Wonderful empowers companies to bring suit against 
competitors whose false or misleading labels cause competitive 
injury. Although this decision effectively safeguards competitors’ 
commercial interests, the holding also has broader implications. 
Because preemption, primary jurisdiction, and class certification 
challenges remain viable roadblocks preventing successful consumer 
class actions, it is likely that plaintiff’s lawyers will bring 
competitor-based Lanham Act suits with greater frequency.103 
Moreover, if lower court decisions interpreting POM Wonderful 
provide any guidance, the Court’s holding may apply to a wide array 
of product labeling cases aside from food and beverage labeling.104 
Finally, POM Wonderful may indicate that the Supreme Court will 
look to private rights of action instead of administrative regulations 
98. Id. at 499.
99. 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
100. Id. at 1879 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
101. See POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2238 (2014) (“The FDA,
however, does not have the same perspective or expertise in assessing market dynamics that 
 day-to-day competitors possess.”). 
102. See Reply Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 22, POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. 2228 (No.
12-761), 2014 WL 1410441, at *22 (arguing that the FDA lacks the resources to engage in any
meaningful oversight of misleading food labels).
103. Reich et al., supra note 50.
104. Duffy, supra note 87.
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because of the Court’s growing concern over administrative 
agencies’ unchecked power and questionable expertise.105 
105. See POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2238; City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1879 (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting).
